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Bernard Tschumi

Urban Pleasures and the Moral Good

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What is the reality of the political commitment of the architect? What is the definition of the social realm? Architects are constantly confronted by these issues and, historically, have responded to them in different ways, alternatively repressing the social through purely formal elaborations or minimizing the elitist terrain of form in the pursuit of pointedly social articulations. The constraints peculiar to architecture — the impediments posed by the lengthy process of design and construction and the interface of client demands — have their own roles in the process, somewhat muting the architect's power to enact his or her commitments directly. These conditions have always informed architectural practice and, short of dramatic changes in technology and patronage, probably always will. But I would venture that there is something "different" happening today in the way that we conceive of the social.

Today's transitional state after the collapse of the certainties of modernism as well as postmodernism has stimulated intense questioning,

triggering rich and pleasurable exploration in terms of both projects and theoretical investigations. Issues elaborated in theory inform the making of buildings, and vice versa, integrating terms once falsely, if logically, separated and opposed. A key question surfacing throughout these explorations has been that of the "events" or combinations of social activities that take place in architectural spaces, and the way in which the pressure exerted by these events informs both the making of buildings and the development of new urban strategies.

Another, contradictory, approach has been to deny the validity of such investigation in the name of "reality" and the appropriateness of form, denouncing serious inquiry into the ways in which society produces the forms of space that it inhabits. This second position generally has been antiexploratory, antitheoretical, anti-intellectual, and sometimes antiartistic, operating in the combined names of formal and social values. Represented in some of our major newspapers

and periodicals, it assigns moral values to buildings, presupposing the existence of a public common good and denying value to architectural research that is not aimed directly at a defined social context. It is best exemplified in the new "formal moralism" represented by recent architectural criticism in *The New York Times*.

The Incident

In order to discuss this opposition properly, I need to contextualize it a bit, and to mention the combination of an exhibition of our work at the Museum of Modern Art and the publication of two books that has triggered a discussion on the question of the architect's social role. The aim of this grouping of "events" was to present our work simultaneously in three different, opposed, but complementary forms: a book of writings, *Architecture and Disjunction*, just published at that time; a six-hundred-page documentation of recent architectural projects, *Event-Cities*, published to accompany the exhibition — no trendy designer's coffee-table book, but an exhaustive and objective analysis of selected projects, all in black and white, describing the design process from conceptual sketches to working drawings; a show at MoMA, intended to demonstrate to the public that architecture could be exciting and, in its relation to events, even excessive and pleasurable.¹ All three — texts, archives of drawings, three-dimensional experimental display — were intended to be read together as a heterogeneous presentation of a position.

Now we all know that society likes to categorize things: a book of writings is a book of writings, a show is a show, and a book of projects is a book of projects. There is enormous resistance to the contamination of categories that cultural practice actually involves. For example, the museum was reticent about displaying the books at the public opening of the exhibition because it might distract the viewer from the work on the walls. Not surprisingly, the three journalistic reviews that appeared during the first week concentrated on each artifact separately, superbly ignoring the fundamental correlation that had been constructed with the others. No mention of *Architecture and Disjunction* in the exhibition review, no mention of the exhibition in the book review. The third review talked endlessly about my red scarf, my relation to my father, what clubs I went to with a former girlfriend, but about neither books nor show. None entertained the idea of a serious analysis of the relation between the books and the exhibition.

While this may seem a heavy weight of incidental details, they are less personalized ephemera — the surroundings of today's sensationalized journalism — than incidents, *faits divers* that textualize and, in so doing, produce a specific discourse, a concrete ideology about architecture and its cultural position. The three texts, written by three different writers, two published in *The New York Times*, one in *The New York Observer*, are reluctant to engage a practice or a presentation perceived as "against nature."² In one article the combination of

"glamorous architectural images and *radicalism*" is attacked. In the second it is "*radicalism* and the rules of design." In the third article it is "*radical*, bohemian avant-gardism [that] navigates the corridors of power." Words, in all three texts, are telling. The consistency of the attack is reassuring. At least we know what the problem is. Or do we?

We have to pay attention to language here, as it aims to describe, since it conveys, somewhat against itself, a whole set of established assumptions. In Herbert Muschamp's article entitled "Urban Dreams, Urban Realities" that appeared in *The New York Times* on the Friday after the show's opening, our work was described as "paper architecture" — flashy images — although four of the five buildable projects exhibited are either already built, in construction, or scheduled for construction. I was compared to Morris Lapidus, "the legendary designer of Miami Beach hotels"; the color of several drawings to the "luscious, Max Factorish red" on a "starlet's lips"; the urban concepts to "the conventional notions of developer's programming in shopping malls" (although our work seems to attract only socialist towns and educational institutions). The formal characteristics of the work, it was insisted, are less startling than those of Koolhaas, Pritz, Libeskind, and others (despite the fact that I am not interested in form and never have been).³ The *Times* architecture critic continued by stating that the "most provocative precedents for [our work] lie well outside the avant-garde, namely in the 'Google'

style of 1950s California roadside coffee shops like Googie's, Biff's, Ships, Pann's and Bob's Big Boy." He then compared an illuminated model for one bridge in our Lausanne Bridge City project to an advertising slogan for "that populuxe item, the Princess telephone." The Lausanne model had been presented with illumination for a clear purpose — to provoke, to annoy, to disturb, especially in relation to the classical museography Muschamp had praised in the Frank Lloyd Wright blockbuster located three floors below. Together with Terence Riley, director of the Department of Architecture and Design at MoMA and curator of the exhibition, I had decided to show that architecture could be alive, could question and challenge received ideas about what an exhibition is supposed to be, even in the temple of culture represented by MoMA. Elsewhere, the critic peppered his text with derogatory misfacts, describing, for example, the bluish-green color of the oxidized copper of the Kansai Airport competition project as painted "turquoise, that cool '50s tone." The superficiality of the commentary was not surprising. The attack was purely formal, but it disguised itself as content.

When Muschamp's review appeared, people called me to "explain" the vicious ad hominem attack and its peculiarity relative to the normally studied decorum of cultural criticism in the *Times*. Some said that the *Times* architecture critic had wanted to assert his power over Terence Riley. Others said that he was upset that I had

"taken Rem's spot," since Koolhaas's exhibition at MoMA was postponed from spring to fall, and Muschamp is known to be an unconditional and obsessive admirer of Rem's. This attachment took on another resonance in view of his description of my work as aping 1950s forms. Still others traced his rancor to the days when he was apparently one of my students at the Architectural Association in London (although he is my age and relatively unknown to me). Mention was made of the "Parsons connection," referring to the school to which the critic was until recently attached, where Columbia University is sometimes referred to — derisively — as the Acropolis. Was the critic opportunistically trying to assert his place in a power triangle: the Media, the Museum, the University?

Indeed, the *Times* architecture critic had gone "for blood" at an architect only once before, in the October 1991 issue of *Artforum*, where he described John Hejduk, another dean of a school of architecture, as the "Mike Milken of paper architecture," whose "gorgeous" drawings were the equivalent of junk bonds and whose world was "only a dream to begin with."⁴ I was lucky to be Morris Lapidus. The relations between value, use, and usefulness expressed here thrive on an opposition between (valueless) paper architecture and (socially useful) building. Again the incident has something behind it. In the late 1980s — 1986 or 1987 — the writer was working on a book on narrative architecture, which is paper architecture by definition. The book was

apparently completed, scheduled for publication but, due to wrenching personal experiences, never published. I am told that an outline shows that this discourse on narrative work had among its chief protagonists two architects, Hejduk and Tschumi. The situation, as psychodrama, is interesting: paper must be burned, defiled, excoriated so that the building can rise — the attempted ritualized murder of theoretical architecture.

The Agenda

Running through the lines of "Urban Dreams, Urban Realities," along with other articles by the *Times* critic, is a larger agenda, incorporating many revealing presuppositions about what "good" or moral form should be. I will not comment here on the subjective biases of this type of criticism, its constantly aesthetic and formal frame of reference, or its humanistic predilection for an architecture of unity, composition, and reconciliation.⁵ But the agenda incorporates puritanical themes I wish to comment on, namely, that of the need to "resist" market pressures (pressures that are never fully defined) and that of the opposition between a culture of fragmentation and a collective imperative of unification, of "putting it all back together." These themes are often fused; indeed, there is a focus on the power of different market organs from real estate development to advertising, and a corresponding failure to examine the force of institutions, in particular, institutions of government, and their illusory ideology of unity. Thus, drawing on and distorting texts attributed to

me but actually authored by the museum, Muschamp proclaims, "like a sheep in wolves' clothing, Mr. Tschumi seeks to conceal how tame his ideas are. It's earth-shattering, it's dangerous, it explodes: this is the advertising lingo of today's avant-garde."

The question is, Who is the sheep?

One of the peculiarities of this kind of journalism is not its overt personalism, familiar from mass-market magazines, but its reliance on more hidden, "sheeply" assumptions that hold together the fold and insure its orderly replication. Many of these ideas have to do with questions of the social, and of social function, and most involve notions of order, especially, the notion of a social unity, a "natural" state from which we all have fallen and that we must all strive to reclaim.

The idea of the need to "unify" our cities is questionable in the face of the very heterogeneity of everyday life, of disparate and "different" cultures, and, most particularly, of our knowledge that such unity is determined by and on behalf of those who are always already empowered. But I want to comment here on the moral and prescriptive tone, and role, assumed by the writer and critic. This has usually been the terrain of the conservative Right, but it has new inflections today. The *Times* critic concludes his review by attacking the Museum of Modern Art for "capitulating" to my view of urbanism, which he calls a "beach resort conception of urbanism," and proceeds to explain what the museum should do instead — surveys of an ecological and his-

torical nature, presented "in a manner suitable for museum display." The authoritarian imposition of position nudges against "suitability," the domain of conventional acceptance. Rarely have we heard a journalist tell an architect, an artist, a composer, or a thinker what he or she should make or think. The notion smacks of moralism and its companion, legislating opinion.

The Common Good, Moral Values

This appeal to morality is frequent in today's society, advanced as much on the Left as on the Right. It is evident in architecture and art magazines in a call for work constructed on behalf of society understood as a preexisting thing, an already-established community. Again, the code name is unity. In an article in the *Times* published the same weekend, and illustrated in the polychrome hues of the *Times'* new color print, the same architecture critic made a peculiarly seductive attack on Peter Eisenman. It would be wrong for me to stand up for Peter, whose remarkable perverseness exceeds my own. But the words — the matter of language — point to more fundamental presuppositions. Throughout, an appeal is made to "lucid, humane, traditional values."⁶ In one instance, for example, the *Times* critic writes that "contextualism stands for responsibility: it encourages architects to subordinate their egos to the common good." Eisenman, he remarks, "drains the idea of its moral value." The question of who constructs the "common good," and who represents the community, is not asked.

This appeal to moral values is widespread, but rarely does it find such outspoken formulation. Perhaps the sole exception has been Hilton Kramer who, in his send-off issue of *The New Criterion* and repeatedly, though less flagrantly, in succeeding issues, sounded the trumpet of a moral campaign in art that reflected the legislating power of his own morality. If Hilton Kramer has been the moralizer of the conservative Right, we now have moralizers of the conservative Left.

In alluding to a new way in which we conceive of the social, I am suggesting that there is a change going on in the definition of the responsibility of the architect and that the conservative Left has chosen to define this responsibility in its brutest and most populist manner — as building in an unreflective way for an unexamined public. And I am also suggesting that, in contrast, we are witnessing today an imperative by many architects to rethink the established coordinates of architecture, drawing on illuminations in the social sciences, philosophy, and cultural disciplines, so as to arrive at a more socially inscribed and socially productive *practice*.

In fact, the terms of theory and practice have never been more fruitfully engaged, and I would argue that what is unprecedented in certain architectural work over the past decade is the use of theory to develop concepts that inform the actual making of buildings as well as to examine concepts excluded from the domain of architecture by its inherited and proscriptive dualities of form and use.

"Paper" has not been privileged in and of itself, but as an intermediary stage — necessary in the development of architecture as a discourse — to discuss, elaborate, and, finally, "embody" thought in a critical and constructive building practice. Little of such work has been designed to be "confined to paper" (although some of its trajectory has been blocked by the recession); moreover, in retrospect, it has had little effect in permeating the marginal domain of the commodity drawings market. Furthermore, as a marketing tool — as "public relations" — it functions poorly in a society that privileges concrete objects over thought. The response by the conservative Left has been to exclude such productive and wholly "practical" forms of research in the name of notions of the community and representation that exclude the impolitic question of the politics of representation, as well as in the name of a reduced form of architectural purpose. The value-laden discourse on the moral responsibility of the architect takes on strident tones in this definition of architecture's social purpose. Thus, discussing a critical project by Elizabeth Diller and Ricardo Scofidio, but also touching on (equally critical) projects designed to be built but squelched by economics, Muschamp can comment on their "highbrow" evasion of "conventional practice": "Right now, the values these architects ought to think about reversing are their own. Hey, you, wanna make architecture? Take the plunge. Down the hatch."⁷ Again and again, in this and other articles, the *Times* critic reiterates that "many architects and others have

come to feel that to practice architecture as an art is at best amoral, at worst a fraud perpetrated on the public at its expense."⁸

Architecture, unfortunately, lies behind other disciplines, particularly art and political studies, in its investigations of the *structuring* of social space. It continues to describe that space as a given, a thing, that can be alternately served or serviced through specific programs, "functions." In consequence, it regards the social unproblematically, ignoring the ways in which the social is articulated or brought into being in and through building. The ways in which programs dynamize space, either impeding or activating social processes, is rarely addressed, nor is the way in which that space is constituted as a *process*. Fixing things — "architecture is an art of pinning things down," to quote the *Times* — is the unfortunate focus of architectural discourse.

Pleasure, Disprogramming

I would suggest that it is erroneous to make a moral appeal for the social since that appeal is always predicated on an existing sense of the social, based in established humanitarian values. These values have, historically, excluded or restricted the domain of pleasure for innumerable citizens of the so-called world order; they are humane to the few. Even the most laudable efforts at involving the community in the process of its own determination of its spaces has an underlying problem: when asked about their desires, community responses generally repeat the es-

tablished codes of spatial use and design — the *doxa* of social use. What might be needed, instead, is to stimulate the situations that allow inhabitants to speculate on what an appropriation of our cities might be, moving from questions of "adequate living conditions" to the exhilarating pleasures of urban space.

Pleasure is not hedonism pure and simple, but rather a political term — again, broadly addressed in other disciplines — that has an enormous role to play in "thinking" spaces that do more than repeat established architectural codes. And if there is anything that deconstruction, *not* deconstructivism, has taught us it is that we should be suspicious of the kind of concern that speaks on behalf of the "common good" while effectively determining and reinforcing what that good should be. This is ideology purporting to be "natural," received idea masquerading as social concern. The foundations do not reveal their founding violence. They require "radical" examination.

In suggesting that our naturalized image of architecture as a duality of form and social use requires examination, I am touching on the terrain of the programmatic, in particular, of the ways in which new modes of social activity and pleasure require new and complex programmatic types. To recognize and to inquire into these developing social forces is not, as the *Times* critic tells us, to capitulate to "market pressures" ("surely the truly radical gesture would be to resist those market pressures"); instead, it is to elucidate what is masked, mystified, and

superficially controlled by the developer's pursuit of a unifying social ambiance. It was for this reason that we included in the MoMA exhibition, as an introduction to the buildable projects that deal in various ways with the issue of program, *The Manhattan Transcripts* (1977–81), a set of theoretical projects that employ paper space as a terrain in which to engage a series of specifically architectural speculations informing the relations between buildings and their use. Fictions — stories — permitted a means to introduce the social activity or the event into space, moving attention away from the contours of buildings and onto the pressures exerted on them by the multiple, unpredictable, often violent activities of bodies; the figures in these drawings are metaphors for the social and its effects in and on space. Moreover, the unlikely combinations of activities, in which soccer players sported over battlefields and pole-vaulters navigated piano bars, are keys to a condition, characteristic of the contemporary metropolis, in which the terms of different programs or events intersect in dense, often conflictual structures. Transprogramming, disprogramming, crossprogramming — all concepts elaborated in later writing and built form — are pursued in this early theoretical project.

The *Transcripts* are "about a set of disjunctions among use, form, and social values. The non-coincidence between meaning and being, movement and space, man and object is the starting condition of the work," I wrote at the time. When this disjunction became an architectural

confrontation, a new relation of pleasure inevitably occurred. Pleasure — the excess or supplement to any architectural equation — came from that point of non-coincidence, of disjunction, of failure between the (supposed) cause-and-effect relations of meaning and form, use and space. In this sense, the *Transcripts* play with and against narrative conventions: if they use the dimension of time to transcribe the motions of the body in and through space, they also defeat that assumption of narrative by which the succession of events come to closure around an ending, a meaning, a fixed point that can be "pinned down." Something in the architectural equation *resists* being *pinned down*.

Underlying the argument expressed through the (socially degraded) form of paper drawings and using the (architecturally degraded) terms of theory was the core of what became both recent built work and the essays in *Architecture and Disjunction*. Throughout them I argued that architecture's strength lies in its disjunctions. Programmatically, the non-coincidence between buildings and their content, their use, is acutely architectural: it is not only the terrain of pleasure, where the paradoxical power of buildings comes from the "excessive" play of sensation as it develops from the *conflict* of codes, but also the "place" where architecture meets the broader realm of culture — the "events" shaping our culture — and, in this manner, negotiates a new relationship with society. The "disjoined" character of architecture places it squarely in the context

of cultural and social questioning, despite all "traditional," "humane," or "humanitarian" attempts to bring back "unity" or "harmony." "Architecture seems to survive . . . only wherever it *negates* itself, where it transcends its paradoxical nature by negating the form that society expects of it. In other words, it is not a matter of destruction or avant-garde subversion but of *transgression*."⁹

Radical

Again, it is not a matter of subversion. There is no need to style oneself as a "cultural revolutionary" or as a "radical," red scarves notwithstanding. But I would venture that there is something slightly "radical" in this argument for the social use of architectural disjunction if we examine the ways in which it goes against "nature," against *doxa*, against our institutionally prescribed notions of what architecture can and *should be*. Radical, after all, means two things: coming from the root word "radix," or root (a nice tautology), it means both "foundational" and its opposite — a derooting, extirpation, a rupture that contravenes and *disrupts* nature. Poor radical, a simple word, is already condemned from its origins, a sad fate that has been the same for all theory applied in the context of architecture that aims to deroot, destabilize, denaturalize thought.

We all know that architecture has an uneasy relationship to power and to the "powers that be," but we seldom question the power embedded in this naturalized image of architecture. In our puritan,

work-based environment, it depends on one clear metaphor: The building, our old machine, must "work," answering to its designated use, in the way prescribed by convention. The model of efficiency — of a seamless coincidence between space and its use — literally dominates to the exclusion of the excess, the troubling supplement, the part that does not "fit" within the code. Indeed, all excess is condemned, devalored: it is either "useless" or marked by our puritan, value-ridden terminology: hedonistic, sensuous, sensate, gratuitous, glamorous, "irresponsible" to the demands of function, order, the efficient "working" of architectural society.

The overriding puritanism of architectural discourse has led, on the one hand, to a slavish and enslaving adherence to a notion of function and, on the other, to an arbitrary restriction of the scope of pleasure, the social experience of space. Architecture has often been turned into a series of established rules, of prescriptive codes that define not only what buildings should be but what our relations to them should be — that is, how they are used and what modes of activity and pleasure they should support. Moreover, on the plane of urban use, in particular, the reproduction of the code leads to the replication of the established social relations of the city. These, as we know, exclude more than they include and attempt, always, to mask those exclusions under the banner of unity, the social fabric itself.

In suggesting that the way in which we use spaces, both in our domestic environments and in the public

realm, is more complex than we imagine or than the codes permit, I do not want to imply that we should be against social programs. We need to design housing, hospitals, parks, health clinics, and other overtly social forms, but not without considering how they answer to their users above and beyond the (obviously necessary) fulfillment of functions. And we should not cherish the illusion that we can "heal" society, "put it back together," because we are divided through and through: heterogeneous, multiplicitous, not discrete, single, unified. The relations we entertain among each other are not so simple.

Conservatives of the Right, Conservatives of the Left

Is it really "hedonism" we're discussing?

Now, in the review entitled "The Radically Useless Building" published in the *Times* Book Review Section, Thomas Hine, the architecture critic of *The Philadelphia Inquirer* and the author of *Populuxe* and a forthcoming history of packaging, takes issue with the disjunction between space and event. One response to the "indeterminacy of function," he notes, "would be to explore and exploit the possibilities of those things that will last at least as long as the work. Among these are the sun, the climate and other natural qualities of place, and the materials of which the building is made." "Mr. Tschumi's work," he continues, "lacks the primitive, truly architectural pleasures created by light and shadow, color and

texture, expansiveness and enclosure, rhythm and incident." Mr. Hine concludes, "exciting as Mr. Tschumi's ideas are, nobody should try them at home."

Forgive me if I quote myself again. In an article from 1977 entitled "The Pleasure of Architecture" that is reprinted in *Architecture and Disjunction*, I wrote, echoing similar concerns in the field of literary criticism: "The ancient idea of pleasure still seems sacrilegious to contemporary architectural theory. For many generations any architect who aimed for or attempted to experience pleasure in architecture was considered decadent. Politically, the socially conscious have been suspicious of the slightest trace of hedonism in architectural endeavors and have rejected it as a reactionary concern. And in the same way, architectural conservatives have relegated to the Left everything remotely intellectual or political, including the discourse of pleasure. On both sides, the idea that architecture can exist without either moral or functional justification, or even responsibility, has been considered distasteful."¹⁰

Elsewhere I wrote that "there has never been any reason to doubt the necessity of architecture, for the necessity of architecture is its non-necessity. It is useless, but radically so." I might elaborate this with a question: Use-/ess, or more?

Power

To conclude, I would like to say a word on the strategies that confront any architect who must invariably deal with architecture's

relationship to power. We all know that architecture bears an uneasy relationship to power and that those who commission works of substantial scale represent power, whether it is capitalist power in America or state power in Europe (the two poles often meet). And I venture that there are three general ways for the architect to handle this unavoidable relationship. The first is to join in, to come on board, to float nicely on the stream and, if you are good at it, to surf exquisitely on the wave of the established economic or political logic — that is, “architecture at the service of.” The second way is to “resist” those market or political pressures, as the *Times* architecture critic prescribes, to try to slow down the tide, to build a “humane” world, with harmonious streets, town squares, and

so forth. Throughout the city one can find exquisite pockets of resistance, small jewels, remarkable fictions that, somewhat uncritically, seem to oppose the pressures that have made our cities, for better or for worse, what they are. This process regularly involves an attempt to turn the clock back, whether in the form of eighteenth-century gables or revisionist early modernism. This call to resistance is to be witnessed both in the corners of the conservative Right and on the conservative Left, and it has always existed.

I would like to suggest a third attitude: Not to float with the tide, not to try to resist the stream, obviously and “formally,” but, on the contrary, to *accelerate* it so as to arrive at another urban condition that — yes — “exhibits infectious delight in

the city’s crowds, moods and visual complexity, its constant sense of possibility and surprise [with] buildings that intensify these sensations.”¹¹ This is not a matter of “packing with program,” as in the developer’s mall, which results in a unified, homogeneous sphere of excitements, a place of passive consumption. Rather, it is a matter of careful disposition of programs and events so that they maintain their homogeneity, their interruptions. This view of architectural practice as a response to the important differences in contemporary society corresponds to our public both as it constitutes itself and as it defines its spaces through use. It may be a “cinematic” space, as the *Times* critic suggests, but it is *not* a space of illusion.

Notes

1. *Architecture and Disjunction* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1994); *Event-Cities* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1994).

2. Herbert Muschamp, “Urban Dreams, Urban Realities,” *The New York Times*, 22 April 1994, C26; Thomas Hine, “The Radically Useless Building,” *The New York Times*, 17 April 1994, book review sec., 9; Nicolai Ouroussof, “Architecture’s Radical Without Risks,” *The New York Observer*, 25 April 1994, 15.

3. The difference between form employed as a generative concept in architecture and its derivation from programmatic concerns in the final stage of a project is one that I intend to discuss elsewhere.

4. *Artforum* (October 1991): 13–15.

5. Parallel to architectural design, architectural journalism is based on two distinct traditions: a formalist and impressionist one, to which *The New York Times* belongs, whether as attraction or as repulsion, and a functionalist one. See, for example, Herbert Muschamp’s fascinated attraction/repulsion with the respective work of Frank Gehry and Peter Eisenman. Often the terms of reference are similar.

6. *The New York Times*, 24 April 1994, sec. 2 (“Arts and Leisure”), 1.

7. *The New York Times*, 1 August 1993, sec. 2 (“Arts and Leisure”), 38.

8. *The New York Times*, 17 October 1993, sec. 2 (“Arts and Leisure”), 1. Another aspect of this ideological stance can be seen in a panel discussion entitled “Shared Space: A Discussion on the Shifting Roles and Responsibilities of Architects and Artists,” organized by Nicolai Ouroussof and including as panelist Herbert Muschamp, at the Drawing Center in New York on 7 June 1994. Its press release description read, “The middle ground between art and architecture has grown to such proportions that it sometimes seems to have devoured both. The artists, architects, and critics invited to participate in this panel have aggressively questioned the forces — political and economic — that *really*

shape our world. But for the artist, theoretical and political ideas are anchored by a sensitivity to scale and material. Architects who shun a more conventional practice for abstraction and conceptualism risk detachment from the greatest issue they face: how to build a humane world. Are they cutting themselves off from a deeper responsibility? Is this a line that cannot be shared?”

9. “Architecture and Transgression,” in *Architecture and Disjunction*, 78.

10. “The Pleasure of Architecture,” in *ibid*, 81–82.

11. Muschamp, “Urban Dreams, Urban Realities.”